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The Asian crisis came as a big surprise to all: investors, credit rating agen-
cies, international institutions, and, not least, oﬃcials in the crisis countries.
There is no question that the long-run performance, hard work, high saving
rates, and seemingly competent oﬃcials all added up to create a powerful
presumption that all was well.1 They gave assurance that problems, if any,
would be isolated and manageable, and because everyone held that belief,
everyone reinforced everyone else’s unquestioned beliefs. There was equally
no question that, once the weakness in balance sheets revealed itself, every-
one’s skepticism was profound, and their willingness to remain invested was
undermined. In preceding crises there had been little surprise; after all,
crises tended to occur in the usual suspects of Latin America, which never
came as a surprise. This time, the crisis struck the Asian miracle, but the
mechanisms diﬀer little.
What diﬀers in the case of Malaysia, however, is the forceful reaction of
the leadership and the departure from traditional postcrash responses.
Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad staged a dramatic rejection not
only of speculators and the international capital market but also of inter-
national oﬃcialdom. He took recourse to ﬁnancial restrictions with quite a
bit of grandstanding and, indeed, claimed that the country was successful
in averting worse consequences and recovering precisely because of these





Then the unexpected happened. The Asian miracle was shat-
tered almost overnight and suddenly once fawning economists
argued that all it really had been was a bubble, over-inﬂated by
corruption, cronyism and bad loans. Asians were not only im-
poverished but were blamed for impoverishing themselves.
—Mahathir bin Mohamad (1999, 47)
Rudi Dornbusch is Ford Professor of Economics and International Management at the
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1. Of course, there was a discussion about the productivity of Asian economies, but that
concerned the sacriﬁce in achieving growth, not the vulnerability that made for the imminent
crisis.eye of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Group of Six (G6)
treasuries.2 It remains to be explored whether his claim is indeed appropri-
ate or whether it is primarily the domestic grand-standing of a weakened
and challenged leadership that uses international issues to deﬂect attention
from severe domestic political problems.3
The Malaysian case deserves attention not only on its own terms but also
because the presumption of capital controls in response to crises—failing
an early and gracious arrival of the IMF—has become far more of a con-
cern. After all, how can a ﬁnance minister assert that it is good policy for
the country to experience a meltdown, as a matter of principle, to accom-
modate departing investors? Moreover, if it could be demonstrated that this
policy had an appreciably positive eﬀect in a crisis, policy makers would
have to change their views and welcome such a development. Of course, a
presumption of capital controls would create a very trigger-happy interna-
tional environment. It might be argued, with some merit, that the environ-
ment is already explosive and that what is missing is a good response.
Hence, it is no surprise that countries incline toward the national solution,
and it does make for good rhetoric.
In evaluating the Malaysian experience, it must be understood that two
crises were unfolding simultaneously for this country. One was the Asian ﬁ-
nancial crisis, which brought down countries with vulnerable ﬁnancial
structures. The other was the domestic political crisis that arose from the
challenge to Mahathir by the deputy prime minister and ﬁnance minister,
Anwar Ibrahim. In the eyes of the leadership, the political crisis must have
seemed at least as critical as the ﬁnancial crisis; indeed, the ﬁnancial crisis
oﬀered a means to sustain and reinforce political control by creating an eco-
nomic state of siege and policy response. It surely is not a coincidence that
Anwar was deposed literally the day after capital controls were imposed.
If capital controls have not delivered economic results clearly superior to
those of IMF assistance, that does not mean they failed on the political side.
The attacks on speculators who were alleged to have undermined the Asian
dream and the Malaysian model were central to the eﬀort to ward oﬀ chal-
lenges to Mahathir’s leadership. These attacks were intended to convince
their audience that the economic development model (including the 2020
vision and the ambitious public investment programs) was right and that
the rest of the world was wrong. For the time being, they have been eﬀective
in this eﬀort.4
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2. I cite G6 because Japan is not on record as questioning Malaysian policy responses. On
the contrary, it participated with them and led the call for an Asian IMF and new and diﬀer-
ent policy responses to regional ﬁnancial crises.
3. See Haggard (2000), Haggard and Low (2000), and Terence Gomez and Jomo (1999) for
the political setting and its link to capital controls.
4. See Mohamad (1999), where Mahathir presents the case.9.1 Capital Controls
In the 1930s, Nazi Germany invented capital controls, and soon, in an en-
vironment of capital ﬂight and competitive depreciation, much of Europe
adopted controls as well. The system become pervasive and accepted. In-
deed, in the move toward rules paralleling the establishment of the IMF and
the rebuilding of a more open world economy, capital account convertibil-
ity was not part of the picture. It came to the fore much later, after 1958,
when Europe gradually and unevenly shifted to full convertibility. The
usual suspects, France and Italy, took until the late 1980s to make the tran-
sition. Britain did not abolish exchange control until the Thatcher govern-
ment, and in Japan or on the periphery the transition took even longer.
Opening the capital account became the focus of U.S. ﬁnancial policy in the
late 1980s and particularly of the Rubin-Summers treasury, whose agenda
was opening ﬁnancial services trade and domestic ﬁnancial deregulation.
Repressed ﬁnance gave way to an opening of domestic ﬁnance and to more
substantial freedom for cross-border ﬂows.
The case for integrated international capital markets is just like that for
open trade: a more eﬃcient allocation of resources achieved by competi-
tion, diversiﬁcation opportunities, and equalization of risk-adjusted re-
turns. In addition, just as in the case of open trade, an overwhelming case
can be made that restrictions to capital ﬂows create a hotbed of privilege
and corruption around exceptions and loopholes. Finally, the expectation
is that an open capital market—and the accompanying international stan-
dards, regulation, and supervision—will do a better job at allocating capi-
tal than politicized and corrupt local arrangements.
Although a tremendous amount of work reports on the costs of trade dis-
tortions, little is available on the issue of restricted capital accounts.5For ex-
ample, no evidence that countries with open capital accounts (other things
being equal) grow faster has been reported, nor has the converse been the
case. There is, however, work showing that countries with high black-
market premiums (meaning that capital controls are binding) do perform
more poorly. However, these premiums reﬂect not only controls but also
macroeconomic instability, and hence may not be conclusive.
We might approach the question of the eﬀects of controls somewhat dif-
ferently by asking what we would expect from a country imposing controls
on capital ﬂows. In the long run, in the absence of regulatory and tax dis-
tortions, we would expect controls to imply a less eﬀective allocation of re-
sources and hence less growth or diversiﬁcation. In the short term, controls
play quite a diﬀerent role. If they are imposed in the midst of a crisis, unan-
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5. Even the evidence on trade is not unambiguous. See Brock and Durlauf (2000), Rodriguez
and Rodrik (1999), and Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2000).ticipated and temporary, they will work in the sense that they stop outﬂows,
reduce pressure on the exchange and interest rates, and hence avoid a state-
of-siege situation that results in excess bankruptcy and disruption. They are
analogous to a suspension of trading on the New York Stock Exchange or
the Nasdaq or to a bank moratorium—they stop the run and oﬀer time to
set things straight.6Economists’ concern with ad hoc capital controls is less
with the description oﬀered here than with the feared implication that they
will become a substitute for setting things straight. Malaysia is, of course, a
case in point. The major question, obviously, is whether the issue is to gain
time or to make lasting changes in freedom of resource allocation. The for-
mer endeavor deserves much attention, whereas the latter is politically at-
tractive but lacks economic support.
Moving now to the question of Malaysian controls, what might be ar-
gued? Supporters would no doubt claim that in the absence of controls the
collapse would have been far deeper, the recovery much more diﬃcult, the
lasting damage far more profound. If this is the case, a capital-control coun-
try—other things being equal—will look much better than the other coun-
tries that are exposed to the same initial shocks but respond with orthodoxy
rather than controls. Speciﬁcally, to make some progress on these issues, we
should answer these three questions:
• On the eve of the crisis, was Malaysia appreciably diﬀerent in its vul-
nerability from other crisis countries? If so, is that the possible expla-
nation for its purported success in dealing with the problem?
• Did the policy measures—banking, stock market, and capital controls;
business subsidies—perform signiﬁcantly better than in other econ-
omies? Better performance means higher growth, less volatility, and
less-pervasive bankruptcy without any oﬀsetting large increases in pub-
lic debt.
• Is there an indication of lasting costs, or beneﬁts, to the policy choices?
It is as well to anticipate our conclusion. The costs or beneﬁts of capital
controls remain ambiguous, despite their ostensible success in Malaysia. In
actual fact, Malaysia had more favorable preconditions, it did not perform
appreciably better than other crisis countries, and the timing of controls co-
incided with the reversal of the appreciation of the yen, the end of the crisis
elsewhere, and Federal Reserve rate cuts that put an end to the crisis at-
mosphere in world markets. Nevertheless, the reverse case equally holds.
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6. In the aftermath of the 1987 stock market decline, the Brady Commission reviewed the
question of suspending trading and came out in support of circuit breakers as a means to re-
store markets. On the Nasdaq, trading is suspended for companies for whom information is
unavailable. These cases seem to present an interesting analogy for defensible limited-time
capital ﬂow suspensions. If a circuit breaker lasts half an hour on the New York Stock Ex-
change, the equivalent for an emerging-market capital ﬂow suspension might be a month.There is no evidence that capital controls or the failure to apply an explicit
IMF program so far had obviously detrimental eﬀects.
9.2 The Background
It is helpful to examine the context of the Malaysian events. The relevant
time frame extends from the Thai problems that began in spring of 1997 to
the interest rate cuts administered by the Federal Reserve in the aftermath
of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) problem and the Russian
crisis. Various Asian economies joined the crisis progressively.
May–July 1997 Pressure on Thailand, exchange control, two-
tier market, and devaluation occur.
July The Philippines go to a ﬂoat; Malaysia aban-
dons support for the ringgit; Thailand goes to
the IMF.
August Thailand suspends forty-two banks; Indonesia
abandons rupiah support; Malaysia restricts
short selling; Indonesia restricts credit for ru-
piah trading.
October Indonesia goes to the IMF; Malaysia an-
nounces austerity budget; Hong Kong dollar
comes under attack.
November Korea abandons won support and goes to the
IMF.
December Rescue package is designated for Korea.
January 1998 Malaysia announces full deposit guarantees.
January–August Asian IMF packages are revised; ﬁnancial re-
structuring and downgrading take place.
May Indonesia’s Suharto steps down.
August Russian crisis occurs; yen peaks.
September LTCM crisis occurs; Malaysia imposes capital
controls; Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibra-
him is deposed.
September–November Federal Reserve cuts rates by 75 basis points.
The background of the Asian crisis includes the large buildup of capital
inﬂows in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s—not foreign direct investment (FDI)
but bank loans and portfolio capital (see IMF 1999b). The crisis involves
the sudden drying up and reversal of these ﬂows in 1997 and the resulting
macroeconomic pressures of currency depreciation, high interest rates, out-
put decline, and ﬁnancial stress. This reversal in capital ﬂows is shown in the
accompanying ﬁgure for the Asian crisis economies as a group. The coun-
Malaysia’s Crisis: Was It Different? 445terpart of the reversed capital ﬂows is a reserve loss and current account
surpluses in the crisis economies.
The pressure for outﬂows soon reached all economies. Within six months
following the Thai debacle, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Ko-
rea had been hit, and Hong Kong had come under attack.
One summary measure of events is the path of real gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). After performing well up to 1996, growth declined in 1997 as the
economies shifted toward crisis. In the following year, 1998, output de-
clined everywhere; by 1999, recovery was under way. By 2000 even per
capita GDP is above precrisis levels. Judged by these standards, the crisis
was as short as it was deep. However, other measures show more lasting
damage, including an impaired banking system, a signiﬁcantly higher
public debt everywhere, and a loss of growth momentum, accompanied by
the resulting temptation for governments to step in. Another measure that
might indicate diﬀerential performance is the real exchange rate. One might
argue that in a capital outﬂow crisis, other things being equal, countries
with controls suﬀer a less extreme real depreciation. That argument is not
borne out by the accompanying ﬁgure.
9.3 A Closer Look at Malaysia
This paper does not address the immediate reason for the crisis. Chapter
16 in this volume oﬀers a summary of the vulnerability factors—misaligned
real exchange rates, nonperforming loans in the banking sector, and the
funding risk of the national balance sheet due to excess debt or mismatches
of maturity and currency denomination.
With the pressure of capital outﬂows and increases in interest rates—al-
ready under way since early 1995—and poorer export performance, growth
did give way. Ultimately, industrial production declined, only resuming
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Fig. 9.1 External capital ﬂows for crisis-Asia (US$ billions)growth in early 1999; investment as a share of GDP fell sharply, to only half
its previous level; the stock market fell sharply; and the real exchange rate
depreciated substantially.
Much of the macroeconomic scene involves the problems of banks and
ﬁrms whose balance sheets are unprepared for exchange rate movements,
slowdowns, or recessions. The responses of restructuring, bailing out, and
subsidizing are certainly part of the controversial legacy. However, this part
of the recovery process does not diﬀer importantly from that of other
economies, in which none of these responses took place promptly, deci-
sively, or successfully.
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Fig. 9.2 Malaysia and other crisis countries: GDP growth
Fig. 9.3 Real exchange rate (January 1970=100)Table 9.1 Malaysia: Economic Indicators
1990–95 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Growth 8.9 9.8 10.0 7.5 –7.5 5.4 8.5
Inﬂation 3.7 3.2 3.3 2.9 5.3 2.8 1.5
Investmenta 37.5 43.6 41.5 42.9 26.7 22.3 24.1
Budget deﬁcitsa –0.4 3.2 3.9 6.1 –0.9 0.2 –2.6
Current accounta –5.8 –9.7 –4.4 –5.6 12.9 16.0 12.1
External debt ($Bill) 34.3 39.7 47.2 42.6 43.6 45.0
% of GDP 38.7 39.3 47.1 58.8 55.2 50.4
% short term 19.1 27.9 25.3 17.8
Reserves ($billions) 23.8 27.0 21.7 26.2 30.9 33.2
Source: Goldman Sachs, except % short term (IMF 1999c).
aPercent of GDP
Fig. 9.4 Malaysia: Money market and lending rates
Fig. 9.5 Malaysia: Stock market (index January 94=100)
Source: Datastream.9.4 Capital Controls and Their Eﬀectiveness
One possibly critical diﬀerence between Malaysia and other crisis
economies in the region was its imposition of stringent capital controls on
1 September 1998. This went further than the Thai measures, which had al-
ready been suspended by then, and the credit measures that had been used
elsewhere to avoid ﬁnancing capital ﬂight. The details of the capital controls
essentially involved the mandatory repatriation and one-year holding of
oﬀshore ringgit funds as well as restrictions on outﬂow.7 These controls
were partially relaxed in February 1999 to become a system of graduated
exit taxes. FDI ﬂows throughout were exempt, and the exchange rate was
ﬁxed. The drastic attack on capital ﬂows had the eﬀect of stopping capital
ﬂows in both directions, as shown in ﬁgure 9.8, which uses portfolio ﬂow
data (made available by State Street Associates).
According to the canons of IMF policy and commitments, the impo-
sition of capital controls was, of course, a radical measure. Whatever the
reason it was imposed, Mahathir justiﬁed it with a quotation from Paul
Krugman: “[E]xtreme measures might be needed for extreme times” (see
Mohamed 1999, 106). In his justification for dispensing with classical fi-
nancial rules, he might equally well have quoted Keynes: “[I]t is better for
reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”
Where controls decisive in producing this turn of events, or was it taking
place anyway? It is readily seen from the graph above that the stock market
recovery turns in September, as does the recovery of industrial production.
The same is true for short-term interest rates. It is tempting, therefore, to see
the imposition of capital controls as the turning point. However, as the IMF
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Fig. 9.6 Malaysia: Real eﬀective exchange rate (JPMorgan Index 1990 100)
7. See IMF (1999a, 54–56; 1999c). For further references to Malaysian capital controls, see



















































)has rightly argued, at the time that capital controls were imposed, markets
had already settled in Asia and interest rates had started to decline—and
would soon do so everywhere under the impact of Federal Reserve rate cuts
and a reduction in jitters. In fact, rates in Korea and Thailand had fallen by
August to half their June levels, and the same was true in Malaysia.
In fact, as we see from the oﬀshore rates for Malaysia and thus the inter-
est rates faced in the open market, which reﬂect depreciation expectations,
much of the pressure had subsided before the 1 September imposition of
capital controls. By August, the oﬀshore rates had, in fact, declined to
around 10 percent, far below the crisis level. Interestingly, the spike in the
graph at the end represents the time the controls were put in place and
reaches 28 percent on 1 September! Thus, the claim that the pressure con-
tinued unabated is simply not borne out by oﬀshore interest rates. On the
contrary, the advent of controls raised rates. The political interpretation of
the controls thus deserves more attention.
9.5 Should Malaysia Have Done Better?
Another way of approaching the question of non-IMF policies and the
claim that Malaysia performed well with such policies is to ask how the
country compared to others in vulnerability. Two issues inﬂuence perfor-
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Fig. 9.8 Malaysia: Portfolio ﬂowsmance: initial conditions and policy responses. If performance was not sub-
stantially diﬀerent across diﬀerent countries, one might argue whether it
should have been simply because initial conditions were signiﬁcantly more
favorable or unfavorable to start with. In particular, very bad balance sheets
would imply more diﬃculty in dealing with the crisis and hence poorer per-
formance. On the other hand, better vulnerability indicators would mean
less stress and hence better performance.
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 show a series of vulnerability indicators. In table 9.3,
Malaysia looks relatively good in the debt-equity ratio of the corporate sec-
tor and, importantly, the ratio of short-term external debt to reserves. Both
the stock market GDP ratio and the private credit GDP ratio are high.
These were, indeed, vulnerable areas because the high valuation reﬂected
the vast amount of bank credit lent to stock purchases (7 percent of GDP).
In table 9.3 we look at the status of the banking system by 1999. Malaysia
looks relatively favorable in nonperforming loans as a share of total loans.
As a ratio of GDP, however, these numbers are high, reﬂecting the large
share of private credit relative to GDP. In Malaysia compares favorably in
cleanup cost, all the more so because the Korean numbers almost certainly
understate the cost of restructuring the banking system and the corporate
sector.
Table 9.4 looks at some numbers for debt and debt structure in the cor-
porate sector. Again, in no way does Malaysia stand out unfavorably. Public
debt in 1996 is higher than in Korea or Indonesia, but certainly not alarm-
ingly so; the banking system and private investment (with or without crony-
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Table 9.3 Nonperforming Loans and Increased Public Debt in 1999
NPL/Total NPL/GDP Increase in Public Debt/GDP (%)
Indonesia 55 22 68.6
Korea1 62 3 20.7
Malaysia 24 35 16.0
Thailand 52 53 34.6
Source: IMF (1999a), World Bank (2000).
Table 9.2 Vulnerability Indicators in 1996
Stock Market Debt/Equity Private Bank Short-Term External
Cap/GDP Ratio Credit/GDP Debt/Reserves
Indonesia 40.0 310.0 55.4 177.0
Korea 28.6 518.0 57.6 193.0
Malaysia 310.0 150.0 89.8 41.0
The Philippines 97.3 160.0 49.0 80.0
Thailand 55 250 100 100
Source: World Bank (2000, 70).ism) were ﬁnancing the development strategy, unlike in Latin America.
However, Malaysia initially shows a better-rated banking system, lower
debt and equity in corporations, and a maturity of debt that is not substan-
tially shorter than elsewhere.
In sum, Malaysia was in no way more exposed than other crisis countries
and, for that reason, should not have been doing worse. Accordingly, it can-
not be argued that the eﬀects of capital controls is contained a situation that
otherwise would have been much worse than those of other countries. Once
again, then, there is no evidence one way or the other.
One more question is whether Malaysia enjoys lasting beneﬁts from the
continuing capital control regime (see Bank Negara Malaysia’s website for
the bureaucratic aspects of ongoing circulars modifying the regime). The
answer here is surely that it is far too early to judge the impact, if any. In the
Exchange Rate Mechanism experience in Europe, the Netherlands paid a
small but lasting price for a one-time devaluation that broke with the tradi-
tion of ﬁxed rates on the deutsche Mark. In emerging markets, diﬀerentials
reﬂect ongoing control regimes, macroeconomic instability, and, impor-
tantly, political uncertainties. To identify the capital control “misconduct”
premium is overly ambitious.
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Comment Michael P. Dooley
I would like to underline two of the many interesting points Rudi Dorn-
busch makes in this paper. First, it seems to me that he is correct in arguing
that politics had more to do with the imposition of controls in Malaysia
than did welfare economics. Controls imposed after nonresidents have
committed their funds are an excellent way to deﬂect blame for a ﬁnancial
crisis away from the authorities and onto foreign speculators. They also dis-
tance the chief executive from those who encouraged opening in the ﬁrst
place. This is not just an emerging-market phenomenon. President Nixon
condemned the gnomes of Zurich as the Bretton Woods system of ﬁxed ex-
change rates unraveled in the early 1970s.
In reviewing work on capital controls a few years ago (Dooley 1996) I
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Michael P. Dooley is a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research and
is a managing editor of the International Journal of Finance and Economics. He joined the fac-
ulty at the University of California, Santa Cruz in 1992 following more than twenty years ser-
vice at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the International Monetary
Fund.found this to be a recurring theme. Economic analysis provides a variety of
rationales for capital controls. However, economists are usually embar-
rassed when politicians invoke their arguments to undertake control pro-
grams that are unrelated to the theory. Moreover, once in place, control pro-
grams take on a life of their own and outlive the original rationale. This is
not a new idea: Cairncross (1973) and Dornbusch (1986) argue convinc-
ingly that control programs that might once have been sensible involve sub-
stantial long-run costs. Dornbusch’s warning in this paper that we will have
to see if the Malaysian controls are costly is based on solid historical evi-
dence.
Is there a sensible economic rational for the Malaysian response to the
financial crisis? The answer is clearly yes. As Dornbusch points out, a sus-
pension of payments is the classic response to a bank run. If the Asian melt-
down was a liquidity crisis, an eﬃcient way to help investors select the good
equilibrium is temporarily to stop the run until they come to their senses. In
the end, investors will thank authorities for doing so. Moreover, the expec-
tation that the authorities will use controls to stop runs and the unnecessary
real costs associated with them will encourage capital inﬂows.
I do not believe this is a useful model for the Asian crisis, but the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and many others do. Thus, the question remains:
If there are conditions under which capital controls can be an eﬀective pol-
icy instrument, why do we have so little evidence that they have been utilized
eﬀectively? As Dornbusch points out, one reason is the diﬃculty in setting
out the counterfactual. The other, I suspect, is that political economy makes
the sensible use of controls an exceedingly rare event.
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Discussion Summary
Nouriel Roubini remarked that the issue of contagion was not discussed in
the paper. He said that around the time that Malaysia imposed capital con-
trols, Russia had already imposed similar measures after it devalued and de-
faulted. Paul Krugman also argued that capital controls were a good idea
and urged crisis countries to impose them. Given that we know that capital
Malaysia’s Crisis: Was It Different? 455controls can be eﬀective only when they are not anticipated, and that they
can actually cause capital ﬂight and even crises when anticipated, Roubini
said that it is important to study how contagion aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of
the Malaysian capital control policies. This is especially the case because
there seems to be a risk of many emerging markets’ imposing capital con-
trols.
Roubini also said that it was important to distinguish between radical
controls—such as killing oﬀshore markets—and partial controls. One ma-
jor diﬀerence between these two control policies is that partial controls
“leak.” For example, Thailand imposed controls in May 1997 on nonresi-
dents’ ability to borrow in the local currency, which led to a large interest
rate spread between the domestic and foreign markets. These controls were
eﬀective for a short time, but the substantial diﬀerence in interest rates cre-
ated a huge incentive for investors to take the money abroad for a higher
rate of return, which eventually led to the collapse of the Thai baht. Similar
partial control policies were in practice in Malaysia in 1998, which may
have worsened the situation there by increasing the speculative capital out-
ﬂow rather than reducing it.
Anne O. Krueger noted that Malaysia had a big problem in 1995, which
triggered a large cut in the ﬁscal deﬁcit and other policies. This brought a
partial restabilization to Malaysia’s economy and was the reason that
Malaysia was in better shape than other countries before the crisis. Krueger
suggested referring to the 1995 event in the discussion. Krueger also said
that the failure of the return of foreign direct investors to Malaysia might
reﬂect that they lost conﬁdence in forward contracts in Malaysia after the
imposition of capital controls.
Martin Feldsteinraised a few questions. First, he asked whether Malaysia
carried out the kinds of structural reforms that the IMF required in other
countries even though it did not oﬃcially adopt the IMF program. His sec-
ond question was related to a point made by Michael P. Dooley,namely, that
Malaysia actually imposed capital controls before the oﬃcial announce-
ment of the controls. He asked if the diﬀerence between the earlier controls
and the oﬃcial ones merely consisted of the treatment of foreigners, as
Malaysian residents could not take money out of Malaysia (while foreign-
ers could) before the oﬃcial controls were imposed in September 1998.
Third, he asked what happened to the foreign creditors whose capital was
frozen in Malaysia due to the controls after the controls were lifted.
In response to Feldstein’s ﬁrst question, Robert Dekle cited an IMF Se-
lected Issues paper on Malaysia, which described the ﬁnancial reforms tak-
ing place in Malaysia. These reforms were similar to those in other program
countries.
Kristin J. Forbes suggested including a discussion of the ineﬃciencies in
the corporate sector before the Asian crisis, such as overleveraging and low
proﬁts, in evaluating the capital control policies. She said that one potential
beneﬁcial eﬀect of the crisis is that it forces restructuring in the corporate
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on proﬁtability instead of growth. She asked if there was evidence showing
that capital controls prolonged this cleansing process and whether Ma-
laysia would suﬀer in the long run.
Simon Johnson supported Dornbusch’s critique of the methodology used
in the paper by Ethan and Rodrick, in particular the timing comparison. He
pointed out that there was tremendous political uncertainty in Malaysia in
the summer of 1998, due to the fact that Anwar was trying to pursue IMF-
type policies that were squeezing the Mahathir-connected ﬁrms. The polit-
ical instability manifested itself in a ﬁght at the party congress, and there
was a serious probability of social disorders and even isolated riots. When
the capital control policies were imposed and Anwar was deposed, the stock
market went up, especially the Mahathir-connected ﬁrms, while the Anwar-
connected ﬁrms suﬀered. Johnson said that this political struggle domi-
nated everything else. Linda S. Goldbergsupported this point by saying that
it is very diﬃcult to do any type of event study in a complex environment
like this one.
Goldberg also noted that Malaysia imposed the capital inﬂow restriction
in 1994. According to her, the theoretical literature predicts that the eﬀects
of capital controls on inﬂows and outﬂows are equivalent regardless of
where the controls were imposed. She asked if one could determine the in-
cremental eﬀects of imposing outﬂow controls.
Giancarlo Corsetti suggested conducting a survey of large Japanese cor-
porations to ﬁgure out whether the reduction of FDI to Malaysia was due
to a change of strategy as a result of Malaysia’s capital control policies.
Jorge Braga de Macedodrew attention to the broad social costs of the im-
position of capital controls. The imposed capital controls dramatically re-
duced the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalization (in a country that was very
much capitalized), sacriﬁcing ﬁnancial freedom and reducing transparency,
which is socially costly on its own. He also reiterated questions regarding
the political economy of capital controls, such as who administers them,
and the temporary nature of these policies.
Amartya Lahiri suggested taking a diﬀerent direction in the discussion.
Given that we know that capital controls cannot be good in a nondistorted
world, an interesting approach would ask what distortion capital controls
were meant to correct and whether there was evidence of that distortion.
Rudi Dornbusch responded that Holland once devalued during the time
of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, but otherwise it faithfully followed Ger-
many. This kept their interest rate 11 basis points above that of Germany
almost to the day when the European Monetary Union was introduced.
Dornbusch said that in an entirely quiet world it is possible to identify an
eﬀect like this. However, if an emerging-market country sometimes de-
faulted and now we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant impact, we cannot draw a
causal relationship from that.
Malaysia did the “unspeakable thing,” so its eﬀect must inevitably show,
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sition of capital controls happened in the midst of the greatest crisis of the
region, which makes it diﬃcult to ﬁnd the premium that is associated with
it. Moreover, in Malaysia, FDI is substantial and receives special treat-
ment, and the controls are explicitly not targeted to the long-term investors
but to the three-month maturity speculators. Therefore, it is hard to ﬁnd a
substantial impact of capital controls unless they had a devastatingly nega-
tive eﬀect.
Because capital controls did not really hurt, the populist demand to ﬁght
capital ﬂight (rather than saving the economy) was enormously reinforced
by Malaysia’s experience. Moreover, the situation in Malaysia before the
crisis was much more favorable than in other crisis countries, and Malaysia
had actually followed a “shadow IMF program” the year before under in-
tense consultation with the IMF.
Dornbusch concluded that the issue of the eﬀectiveness of capital con-
trols is not resolved except for the unfortunate presumption that they help
politically. Malaysia’s experience is historically important only because it
will nourish capital controls as a politically attractive thing to do. He also
said that the politics after Indonesia were formidably important in this case.
The fall of Suharto meant a potential for instability and a huge redistribu-
tion from his beneﬁciaries to God knows whom. This is going to happen in
Malaysia, but after the imposition of capital controls and the deposition of
Anwar the problem was solved (or postponed) until further notice. The res-
olution of the uncertainty was the reason that the asset markets recovered.
Regarding the question raised by Goldberg regarding the eﬀect of the con-
trols on capital outﬂows given that there were inﬂow controls in place al-
ready, Dornbusch said that the diﬀerence between the two controls was that
the inﬂow controls were anticipated whereas the outﬂow controls were not.
Regarding Feldstein’s question as to whether capital controls were antic-
ipated, he said that he did not believe they were. It is true, he said, that after
seeing what Indonesia did to its Chinese minority, it seemed possible that
the same could happen in Malaysia. In the past twenty-ﬁve years there was
a systematic redistribution from Chinese to Malays, and those going bust
were Malays. Dornbusch agreed that the ethnic issue was very startling in
Malaysia.
Finally, Dornbusch reacted to a comment by Corsetti regarding the link
between Malaysia and Japan. He pointed out that Malaysia and Japan pro-
moted together the idea of an “Asian IMF” and the need to have extra in-
struments.
Dornbusch concluded that although there was no evidence one way or
the other regarding the eﬀectiveness of capital control policies, the debate
will continue. It would be interesting if we found out one day whether the
capital controls actually worked in some way or they were totally political,
he said.
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